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CONTEXT 
J.L. Tuckwell 
This paper concerns Government's surrender, to the private sector, of 
control of telecommunications and (largely) of the radio spectrum. These changes 
are part of the large-scale public sector reforms over the last decade. 
Instead of focussing on the theory of deregulation, corporatisation and 
privatisation, the paper considers its effect (upon telecommunications). It looks at 
how and why the State became involved in (this) public enterprise, in order for 
readers to appreciate the significance of its withdrawal. It acknowledges that the 
social - and international - importance of some enterprises and resources targets 
them for State intervention. In this regard, it raises the question of whether the 
peculiar nature of some resources does not require them to be regulated more than 
others, even after privatisation. 
This paper, then, contributes a broad analysis of one case of privatisation to 
the debate over reforming the public sector. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 10, 200 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is built around a case of interference between 
cellular telephones (which use radio waves) . Telecom Cellular 
Ltd ("Telecom Cellular") runs the existing cellular telephone 
network in New Zealand . BellSouth New Zealand ("BellSouth") has 
bought the spectrum rights it needs to set up a competing 
network. The two companies will use bands of radio waves which 
are side by side in the spectrum: because of the adjacency, their 
signals are interfering with each other. 
The paper tries to develop the historical and conceptual 
context of the case. Until 1989, the New Zealand Government 
managed radio interference . In 1989, Parliament passed an Act 
providing for radical changes to management of the radio 
spectrum. 1 New Zealand's former government-administered 
licensing scheme was replaced by one where private enterprises 
can buy rights to manage and licence out the radio spectrum. This 
change was framed against the deregulation and privatisation of 
many former State enterprises;2 1n particular, of ' the 
broadcasting and telecommunications industries .3 
The historical context, then, is the development of the 
telecommunications industry in New Zealand and its past ties to 
central government. This includes the former spectrum 
management regime. There is an umbrella of international 
obligations. The conceptual aspect follows from the 
governmental connection. From 1984 to 1990, the Fourth Labour 
Government " ... reorganized the structure of the state, shifting the 
basis of much of its activities and the values underpinning them"4 
out of the public sector into private hands. Government used to 
1 The Radiocommunications Act 1989. 
2 Privatisation in particular, is analysed in depth by SK Chew Legal Issues and 
Implications of Corporatisation and Sale of State-owned Enterprises in New Zealand: 
Sale of Air New Zealand (Unpublished Research Paper, Laws 509. Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1989). 
3 Competition was now possible in the (formerly monopolistic) telecommunications 
industry. 
4 J Boston, J Martin, J Pallot, P Walsh (eds) Reshaping the State: New Zealand's 
Bureaucratic Revolution (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991) ix. 
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be responsible for providing and controlling most of New 
Zealand's core industries and services . Now, that is mostly left 
to the 'market' , with a measure of regulation.s In public law 
terms , the regulation of relationships between private persons 
has replaced regulation of individuals' relationships with the 
State. 
This Paper explores that shift - from public to private 
control - in relation to the telecommunications industry and radio 
spectrum policy. Its theme is that 'not all [resources] are created 
equal'! The peculiar nature of some former State assets requires 
that they be regulated more than others , even when 'privatised.' 
Parts I and II of the paper provide the historical context of 
the case study . Part I notes the State's heavy past involvement in 
providing and regulating public services . It accepts that: 6 
[p]ublic enterprises [were] established because of concerns arising 
from public utility values , natural monopoly characterist ics , or 
certain socio-political and economic considerations unique to New 
Zealand. 
Pa rt 11 surveys the growth of one such enterprise , the 
telecommunications industry . In Part Ill , the laws which 
reformed the telecommunications industry and management of the 
radio spectrum are discussed. The Telecom Cellular-BellSouth 
case study is an example of the difficulties in transferring 
control of the spectrum resource to private hands. 
Those conceptual issues are pursued in Part IV . It first 
discusses the legal consequences of selling State assets7 - where 
responsibility lies once a resource is privatised (as compared to 
being State-owned). Government has largely subst ituted 
competition for regulation of telecommunications and 
radiocommunications; Part IV considers the implementation and 
limitations of a competitive regime . From there , the need for 
differing degrees of regulation over different industries and 
5 This is true of both telecommunications and division of the radio spectrum. 
6 Above n 4, 32. 
7 Which is , apparently , a world-wide trend, see Part IV. 
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resources is developed. In particular, specialized intervention is 
required for effective competition between radio spectrum users. 
THE STATE AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
Public enterprise was built up in New Zealand in three 
stages. 8 This Part of the Paper details the extent of the State's 
involvement. It concentrates on the provision by the State of 
services and facilities, mainly in the first stage of development. 9 
It does not attempt a full exposition nor does it analyse the 
underlying social and economic circumstances. 
The Colonists fostered a European economic and political 
system in New Zealand. Colonial Government was set up in 1856, 
and in 1861 the Bank of New Zealand opened. The Government's 
account was quickly transferred to the Bank. Farming soon 
became the Colony's backbone . Because much of the population 
was scattered , the Colony was divided into provinces:1 0 
No one regarded a unitary State as feasible , for the several 
settlements were so isolated that government from one centre was 
virtually impossible. Communications between settlements were 
often worse than those of individual settlements with Australia. 
For these reasons , the provinces had much authority. The 
1852 Constitution set up 6 Provincial Councils , linked by a 
General Assembly (consisting of a House of Representatives and a 
Legislative Council). Central Parliament's laws superseded 
repugnant provincial ordinances and it could reconstitute the 
provinces or revise their Councils' powers. 11 Nonetheless, for a 
period Provincial Councils operated under a 'quasi-federal 
framework of public finance':12 from the mid 1850s to the mid 
1860s, they undertook their own public works developments using 
8 According to Mascarenhas, who divides them into: stage one, the beginnings of the 
colony until about the end of World War I; stage two, approximately 1920 to 1950; 
stage three, between 1950 and 1984 - Above n 4, 28-30 . 
9 From about 1840 until the end of World War I. 
1 O K Sinclair A History of New Zealand (4 ed, Penguin Books, Auckland, 1991) 89 . 
11 Above n 10, 89. 
12 W H Oliver, B R Williams (eds) The Oxford History of New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press , Auckland , 1981) 64 . 
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overseas loans. 13 There was local and foreign investment in the 
Colony. 
By the 1870s, however, depression hit as " .. . the increased 
investment in gold mining failed to check the fall in gold output ; 
the expected returns on money sunk in the purchase of land and 
stock were largely wiped out by declining wool prices" , 14 British 
troops (of the Land Wars) no longer needed to be sustained and 
borrowing by both colonial and provincial governments had 
temporarily exhausted our credit on the London money market . 
The settlers were forced to rely on State assistance . Julius 
Vogel was a particularly strong advocate of State financial 
support , and his policies were popular until the late 1870s. 
According to Sinclair:1 5 
Vogel appreciated that the further advance of the colony was held up 
and settlement largely confined to coastal lands primarily because of 
inadequate transport. Roads were poor and few; there were under 
fifty miles of railway , in three different gauges, and only seven 
hundred miles of telegraph lines in the country . He proposed to 
borrow f 10,000 ,000 in ten years to finance a rapid extension of 
' transport facilities and a vigorous immigration scheme to provide the 
necessary labour. 
Sinclair notes that the provincial representatives 1n 
Parliament hindered Vogel's schemes : "in retaliation , Vogel 
destroyed the Provinces. "16 Central government borrowed nearly 
twice the proposed f 10,000 ,000 . It funded the construction of 
1,100 miles of rails, 4,000 miles of telegraph lines , and many 
roads , public buildings and bridges .17 The boom was followed by 
13 The provinces also controlled immigration , education , and some land policy : 
"[t]heir measures affected the lives of the settlers far more closely than most of the 
acts of the General Assembly"; see above n 10, 108. 
14 Above n 12, 70 . 
15 Above n 1 o, 152. 
16 Above n 10,153. The provincial system was already floundering; the Colonial 
Government had passed an Act in 1867 terminating provincial powers to raise loans. 
Provincial governments were abolished in 1876. They were replaced by boards and 
local councils. 
17 Above n 10, 155. 
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further depression, nearly until the turn of the century . 
Nonetheless, new institutions were set up, such as the 
Government Life and State Insurance Offices, and the Public Trust 
Office. Free, secular State education was introduced. As 
described in Part II, there was important growth in the postal and 
telecommunications industry (under State control). 
Masc are n has 1 8 notes that in the second stage of 
development, primary producers were organised into statutory 
boards; and that after World War II, the Bank of New Zealand and 
the domestic and international airlines were taken into public 
(State) ownership. The third period appears to have been 
characterised by State involvement in resource exploitation and 
finance. 1 9 
This overview simply illustrates the breadth of State 
involvement in public enterprise. According to Mascarenhas:2° 
Trading enterprises have in most countries come under public 
ownership because they have common traits such as: high capital 
needs relative to cash flow; 'lumpiness' in respect of their need for 
capital; natural monopoly characteristics; interdependence of demand 
for their products (e.g. the postal and telecommunication services); 
and, as a result of interdependence, the difficulty of measuring 
benefits from improved technology or investment to consumers . ... 
They are services for which prices are charged, but the prices 
charged are not always enough to cover the total cost of providing the 
service. 
Government had a monopoly over most of New Zealand's core 
industries and resources and it regulated the conditions under 
which they were offered to the public. Since European settlement 
began, it had provided services and facilities to its citizens. The 
conditions of settlement in New Zealand -its topography, its 
scattered settlements and the lack of money in the colony for 
18 Above n 4, 30 
19 Mascarenhas lists, for example, Tasman Pulp and Paper, the Development Finance 
Corporation, the Petroleum Corporation of New Zealand and Synfuels Corporation; 
see above n 4, 30. 
20 Above n 4, 42. 
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taxes - had meant that the settlers depended on government to 
provide public services , in particular, communication links , which 
are examined in Part II. 
I I THE STATE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Until the 1980s, the State had always had a close hand in 
the provision and regulation of New Zealand 's communications 
services. For over 100 years , it controlled postal and 
telecommunications services directly through a Government 
department , most recently called the Post Office.21 This Part of 
the paper traces the development and provision of 
communications services in New Zealand. Then it considers the 
workings of the Post Office as a Department of State and the 
changes made to it in the mid-1980s - the corporatisation of its 
functions. 
A A History of State Involvement in Communications 
In New Zealand before 1840, whalers and traders provided 
an (irregular) mail service. When in 1840 the Treaty of Waitangi 
was signed and the islands added to the British empire , the 
organisation of government included the birth of the New Zealand 
Post Office , the first official Post Office being set up at 
Kororareka.22 It was moved to Russell23 later that year ,24 and to 
Auckland when the 'government' shifted to the new cap ital in 
1 841 . 25 The man in charge of the Post Office was known as the 
Postmaster General. 
21 The Post and Telegraph Department was formed in 1881. Under the Post Office 
Act 1959, the Post Office 'continued' the former department. 
22 The chief settlement in the Bay of Islands. 
23 The temporary seat of government. 
24 With a branch remaining at Kororareka. 
25 "The seat of government was removed from Russell to Auckland early in February 
1841 , and the chief post office was transferred as well as the other departments of 
government" - H Robinson A History of the Post Office in New Zealand (Government 
Printer , Wellington , 1964) 24 . 
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In 1841 news reached New Zealand26 that it had become a 
separate colony, freed from dependency on New South Wales. The 
first postal ordinance was made in New Zealand in 1842,2 7 
allowing the Governor to appoint a Postmaster General and other 
officers, and to contract for the conveyance of mails within and 
from the Colony. Ships' masters were compelled (but paid) to 
carry mails. 
Before the Ordinance was approved by the Colonial Office, 
however, the British Government passed legislation assuming 
control over the New Zealand Post Office. The New Zealand 
Collector of Customs was also to represent the British 
Postmaster General: one historian views the combining (of 
departments) as a British measure to curb the costs of 
government in New Zealand.28 Britain re-transferred control over 
the New Zealand Post Office to New Zealand in 1848. 
Government issued adhesive postage stamps from the 
1850s.29 In 1860, Government began printing its own stamps,30 
and it soon made prepayment of letters by stamps compulsory 
throughout New Zealand. 
For about the first 15 years of the Post Office's operations, 
most internal mail was still being carried by sea because of the 
difficulties in travelling overland. The Local Posts Act 1856 
gave the provinces, who were then very strong, power to set up 
(and fund) additional post offices and routes within their areas. 
Many new offices and land routes were established.31 
26 After a 6-month delay! 
27 It was passed in January 1842 and took effect on 1 March 1842. 
28 Above n 25, 40. 
29 The first stamps used in New Zealand were printed in Britain and issued by the 
Treasury in Auckland. Supplies were later delivered to the chief post office of each 
province. 
30 Postal prices fluctuated with the economy, eg during the World Wars. Also, in the 
twentieth century, Government issued stamps for special (social) causes, eg 'health 
stamps'. 
31 Even so, the transport of mails (by foot or horseback) was slow: it still took two 
and a half weeks for a letter to be carried from Wellington to Auckland; see above n 
25, 58. 
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The Local Posts Act also allowed provincial governments to 
fix local rates, ie to add charges to mails carried on local routes 
or through local post offices (with a view to paying for the 
exte ns ions). 32 Their charges were uneven. The divergency 
between provincial post offices' measures led the General 
Assembly to pass a (central) Post Office Act in 1858, repealing 
all previous Acts. Postal rates were to be standardised and 
would be Gazetted periodically.33 Once again, a Postmaster 
General could be appointed.34 
'Central Government' established a framework for a unified 
postal service. For example, it provided for mail to be prepaid by 
stamps, and it enacted the Local Posts Act 1856. This Act 
facilitated the vast (and needed) growth of post offices and 
routes. At this stage, however, the Government's role remained 
facilitative. Over 20 years, the Colonial Administration, the 
Imperial Post Office in London and the provinces had in turn held 
- and lost or relinquished - some important power over the 
development of the 'Post'. The growth in population, post offices 
and routes all necessitated standardisation. Government 
addressed this need by centralising the system under the 1858 
Act, and maintained its control for well over 100 years. 
When (in 1865) Wellington became the capital, the General 
Post Office was moved to it. A full-time Secretary3s was 
appointed. The location was convenient because the Panama Line 
(bringing overseas mails) had just chosen Wellington as its port 
of call in the Colony.36 
Paths of communication within the Colony still needed to be 
extended. The North Island's overland routes were closed during 
32 Above n 25, 84. 
33 The Act also promoted efficient postal services by, for instance, its heavy 
penalties for the delay or destruction of letters. 
34 By the Governor representing the Cabinet. 
35 Who later became the Director-General. 
36 Robinson traces the interesting -but lengthy- history of New Zealand's external 
mails; see above n 25. Suffice for this paper to note that the early links were 
secured by the State, often with difficulty because of New Zealand's isolation, and 
usually in response to international developments. 
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the 1860s Land Wars and the King Country was impassable for a 
further decade . But the gold rush in the South Island helped its 
provinces to develop. Their populations swelled , staff were taken 
on at existing and new post offices , and new routes and faster 
mail services were introduced.37 Banking functions assumed by 
the Post Office since 1867 were especially useful during the gold 
rush. 
Moreover, the telegraph had been invented.38 The Morse 
telegraph sends a 'code' of dots and dashes by breaking the flow 
of electricity along a wire into a ser ies of short and long 
bursts .39 
At first , telegraphs could only be used on land ; Canterbury 
Provincial Council erected the first public telegraph line (from 
Christchurch to Lyttleton) in 1862 , and other South Island 
provinces quickly set up others. The North Island was not 
connected , and the isolation of the then-capital , Auckland , was a 
particular problem. Again, Government took a hand. The Electric 
Telegraph Act 1865 gave Central Government power to set up , 
maintain and regulate electric telegraph communication , and 
vested authority in a commissioner for building land lines and an 
inter-island connection. Central Government had an underwater 
telegraph cable laid across Cook Strait in 1866. The Telegraph 
Department was set up in this decade , and New Zealand joined the 
International Telegraph Union ,4° which regulated telegraphy 
between member States . 
Vogel's expansionist policies41 during this period gave New 
Zealand increased physical capacity for communications: there 
was simply a larger infrastructure to link the country together. 
The Government purchased and built more telegraph lines across 
37 Auckland province also experienced a period of growth due to the discovery of gold 
there. 
38 In the 1830s and 1840s. Morse telegraphed his first message in 1844. 
39 At the receiving end, an electromagnetically-controlled instrument draws the 
coded message onto paper. 
4 o In 1865. 
41 See above Part I. 
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the country . By 1872, Auckland was connected telegraphically to 
Wellington and the South Island. Also , a telegraph cable was laid 
between Sydney and Nelson (in 1876) ,42 which let the colonists 
communicate with people in Australia and in Britain (because 
Australia had been linked with Britain by cable since 1872) . A 
'Pacific cable' was laid in 1901-1902. The Eastern Extension 
Telegraph Company had in 1890 laid a second cable leading to 
England but "this route to the mother country was the monopoly of 
a private company, and it went through regions likely to be 
obstructed if a European war came".43 The Pacific cable was 
owned by Great Britain and participating colonies: it was to be 
paid off in 50 years with a deficit (shared between the parties) in 
some years. 
B The Seeds of the Post Office 
New Zealand's Telegraph Department had been combined 
with the Postal Department in 1881 .44 By then , telephones were 
used in New Zealand. Instead of using coded bursts of electricity 
(as does telegraphy) , a telephone message is sent along a wire in 
an unbroken electric current which varies in intensity according 
to the pattern of sounds sent. Alexander Graham Bell and Thomas 
Watson first spoke by telephone in 1876. Society took to the 
telephone! At first they were rented out in pairs ; only those 2 
parties could communicate! This led to a maze of wires. From 
1878, central exchanges were developed instead ;45 calls came to 
and were connected at the exchange - initially , by manual 
operators , then later, electronically.4 6 
42 A private company, the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company, laid the cable 
under guarantee by the Australian and New Zealand governments. The (New Zealand) 
Telegraph Department chose the New Zealand site; see above n 25 , 156. 
43 Above n 25, 180. 
44 To become the Post and Telegraph Department. Robinson notes that the Telegraph 
Department's expenditure was then heavily exceeding its income; see above n 25, 
157. 
45 In 1878, the first American telephone exchange was established. New Zealand's 
first telephone exchange was established in 1881. 
46 New Zealand's first automatic exchange was built in Wellington in 1913. 
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Government provided for itse If to co ntro I "electric 
communications by telephone" in 1880.47 Initially , the telephone 
was used here to supplement the telegraph , so it quite naturally 
fell under the control of the Post and Telegraph Department. 
Radio was invented in the late 19th century. Wireless 
communication systems use radio waves (instead of wires) to 
carry the electrical signals . A signal in one wire (antenna) 
generates an electromagnetic field : a receiving wire placed in 
that field can pick up the signal. Early radio communications 
were in Morse code . The New Zealand Post and Telegraph 
Department set up its first 2 radio stations in about 1910, in the 
far north and the far south of New Zealand , with 3 smaller 
stations in between. 
Although the spectrum is a universal , the number of usable 
frequencies is limited , so they need to be regulated. 48 European 
governments set up an International Broadcasting Union . This 
Union was combined with the International Telegraph Union in 
1932, to become the International Telecommunicat ion Un ion 
("ITU") . Today, the ITU is a specialised UN agency with over 165 
member countries.49 It cont inues, amongst other functions , to 
regulate frequency usage of the radio spectrum internationally. 
Member States' representativess 0 discuss uses and divide the 
spectrum into numerous bands - for instance , fixed land-based 
systems versus mobile systems - which are then allocated 
regionally and globally . The divisions are printed in the ITU's 
"Radio Regulations" which bind Member States. Member States 
then allocate ("assign") frequencies to specif ic services 
nationally (along the lines of the broad international allocations) . 
47 Telegraph Amendment Act 1880. 
48 For example , frequencies must be re-used, but if two radio broadcasters were to 
operate on the same frequencies in the same area at the same time, their listeners 
would receive a confusing mixture of signals. 
49 Including New Zealand. 
so From 1959 until 1986, the Post Office represented New Zealand in the ITU: now, 
the Ministry of Commerce does so. 
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Radio telephony was introduced here in the 1920s, and in 
1930 New Zealand began a regular radio telephone service with 
Australia. Radio communications were especially useful when , 
for example , earthquakes destroyed land-lines in 1929 and 
1931 .51 A further refinement of radio was the development of 
Radar ,52 on which much secret war-time work was done by the 
Radio Section of the Post and Telegraph Department.53 
Radio broadcasting began in the 1920s. It was not handled 
by the Post Office , "since mass communication hardly came under 
the supervision of the Postmaster-General" .54 A Broadcasting 
Board reported annually. The Post Office , however, issued radio 
licences and collected the fees! 
In fact, the Post Office had a host of agency functions ,5 5 
including collecting customs duties, acting as agent for the 
Government Insurance Department , receiving taxes , registering 
and licensing motor vehicles , paying pensions and , in some cases , 
registering births , deaths and marriages! This was , perhaps , 
because the numerous post offices throughout New Zealand were a 
convenient way to reach the whole population. 56 (The 
Department's agency function grew even further as more welfare 
measures were introduced).57 
C Consolidation of the Post Office 
The Post Office Act 1959 changed the name of the Post and 
Telegraph Department to the Post Office , and consolidated its 
5 1 Above n 25 , 215-216. 
52 Radio direction find ing ; used in World War II. 
53 Security required that public radiotelephone facilities be suspended during the 
War . 
54 Above n 25, 205. 
55 At the end of World War I; see above n 25, 204. 
56 Above n 25, 204. 
57 "The rapid increase in agency services, from -£ 26 ,000 ,000 handled in 1929 to 
i. 50,000 ,000 in 1937, was stimulated by the determination of Labour to make New 
Zealand into a truly welfare state" ; see above , n 25 , 206. 
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functions. (It remained a government department). In 1964, one 
historian reported that:58 
The actual carriage of mails still remains a very important part of the 
duties of the present-day services. The Department, however, is 
concerned with communications of all kinds, by letter and postcard , 
telegraph and telephone, cable , and overseas radio. In addition, it 
handles millions of pounds worth of business for other departments, 
being an agency service for diverse purposes. It also operates a 
savings bank with branches throughout the country . The Post Office is 
a social service organisation , but at the same time is one of New 
Zealand's largest businesses. 
At about that time, its staff numbered 25,000 ,59 They were 
headed by the Postmaster-General and the Director-General. 60 
The Postmaster-General, a minister in Cabinet , was responsible 
to Government for the direction and policy of the Department. 
The Director-General was responsible to the Postmaster-General 
for the control and general administrat ion of the Post Office . 
'The Administration' of the Post Office was divided into 2 sectors 
known as the Director-General's Office and the Engineer-in-
Chief's Office.61 
New Zealand was divided into 21 postal districts , each 
headed by a chief postmaster,62 and into 3 reg ional engineering 
areas.63 The Post Office's operations divided into 2 streams:6 4 
1) business concerns (postal and agency , 
telelcommunications , and banking) ; and 
2) providing policy advice to Government, regulating 
telecommunications and the radio network, and 
representing New Zealand in matters of international 
post and telecommunications. 
58 Above n 25, 254. 
59 And there were over 1 ,600 Post Offices throughout New Zealand. 
60 Robinson notes that in the 19th century the Postmaster-General took a much 
larger part in the actual administration of the Post Office than more recently ; see 
above n 25 , 255. 
61 The Engineer-in-Chief reported to the Director-General. 
62 Who was responsible to the Director-General. 
63 Divided further into engineering districts . 
64 RN Mason, MS Morris Post Office Review (Report dated 21 February 1986) 18. 
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Government set the rates of return required from the Post 
Office's three principal business areas.6 5 Under the Post Office 
Act 1959, pricing decisions were to be approved by the 
Postmaster-General, which caused delay in decision-making and 
strong tendencies for political considerations to influence 
pricing decisions. 66 Post and telecommunications were cross-
subsidized. 6 7 But the Post Office failed to meet some of 
consumers' needs:68 
By June 1984 16,500 individuals were waiting for the connection of 
their telephones; over 56 percent of business lines were taking 
longer than 5 months to install; and the failure of peak hour calls, in 
metropolitan area [sic], was alarmingly high. 
D The Disbandment of the Post Office 
The Labour Government , which took office in 1984, was 
dissatisfied with the performance of many State agencies . In 
1986, it commissioned a review of the Post Office.69 The 
conclusions were dismal. The reviewers saw the Post Office's 
main problem as being its "inappropriate" organisational 
structure", 70 including unsuitable management accounting 
systems. The internal organisational problems were compounded 
by its status as a Government department: for instance, the 
reviewers stated that:71 
[m]uch of the present inflexibility and constraints on operations stem 
from the need as a Department to obtain approvals through the 
Government approval process ... . [B]ecause of the layers of authority 
involved people remote from the business area can lack a full 
appreciation of the situation. 
65 Above n 64, 18. 
66 Above n 64, 54. 
67 For example, Mason and Morris found the cost of telephone rentals to be too low, 
and the cost of toll calls to be too high; see above n 64, 54. 
68 The Environment for Mobile Communications in New Zealand (Address by the 
Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce to 'Mobile Communications '91 ', 6 August 
1991) 3. 
69 Above n 64. 
70 Above n 64, 56. 
71 Above n 64, 56. 
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Labour introduced large scale public sector reforms. These 
included the corporatisation of many State bodies into SOE's , and 
progressive deregulation of the public sector.72 The SOE system 
aims to separate commercial from non-commercial functions: 
ministers are accountable for controlling the policy of the 
enterprises, which are otherwise commercially competitive like 
normal businesses.73 
Labour created 3 SOE's from the Post Office's components: 
Post Office Bank Ltd, NZ Post Ltd, and Telecom Corporation of 
New Zealand Ltd . Telecom was officially 'in the business ' of 
providing New Zealand's telecommunication services. Spectrum 
management (regulatory and advisory) functions - part of the 
fourth limb of the former Post Office - were hived off to the 
Department of Trade and Industry (which became in 1991 the 
Ministry of Commerce). 
11 I COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY AND 'MARKET ALLOCATION' OF THE 
RADIO SPECTRUM 
This next Part of the paper examines the law governing the 
provision of telecommunications services in New Zealand . Part 
Ill is directed to the changes in that law over the past decade , 
because it aims to lay a framework for the examination (in Part 
IV) of the implications of shifting telecommunications from the 
realm of public to private law. The paper has broadly examined 
Government's role in providing New Zealand's public service 
infrastructure , and its long history (through the Post Office) of 
providing telecommunications services in New Zealand , as well as 
the disbandment of that Department. Now, it briefly follows the 
history of the telecommunications branch of the former 
Department , until privatisation and the removal by law of its 
72 This is thoroughly discussed by Mascarenhas; see above n 4 , and by Chew; see 
above n 2. 
73 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
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monopoly over the prov1s1on of telecommunications services. 
This change allowed competing cellular services to be 
established. 
The Radiocommunications Act 1989 ("the Act") was 
pronounced to be the final major legislative measure in a series 
of telecommunications and broadcasting reforms.74 That Act is 
the vehicle chosen for examining the shift, in relation to 
telecommunications, from public to private law. Cellular 
telephones use radio waves, and the Radiocommunications Act 
1989 drastically altered New Zealand's system of (radio) 
spectrum management. Government (Departments) used to license 
the use of frequencies and bear responsibility for efficient 
spectrum-use between users; the Act lets Government sell 
spectrum rights to private interests, who bear responsibility for 
regulating their uses amongst themselves. The case study earlier 
referred to ( Telecom Cellular Ltd and BellSouth New Zealand) 
illustrates some of the problems that can arise under the new 
system. Part Ill of the Paper concentrates , then, on the effect of 
the Radiocommunications Act 1989 on the provision of cellular 
services - the deregulation of telecommunications coupled with 
Government's withdrawal from management of the radio 
spectrum . 
A The Deregulation of Telecommunications 
As described above, the Government had sought, by 
corporatisation, to increase efficiency and commercial 
competetiveness in the performance of functions of the former 
Post Office. It now instituted a programme of laws to deregulate 
the telecommunications industry. 
In 1987, the Government passed the Telecommunications 
Act 1987, which allowed for some competition in the provision of 
'customer premises equipment' (telephone handsets etc), but gave 
Telecom a monopoly in providing telecommunications services. 
Only 'network operators' were allowed to run a system of 
74 NZ Parliamentary debates Vol 500 , 1989: 12027-12028. 
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telecommunications links:75 the Act defined 'network operator' as 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. The definition of 
'telecommunications link' included one using wires or using radio 
frequencies.7 6 The Act did set up a system for licensing the 
supply and regulating the use of radio apparatus77 but (subject to 
limited exceptions) no licence was available to use radio 
apparatus (ie to run a telecommunications system) in competition 
with Telecom's networks. (The Post Office had planned for 
cellular services and Telecom inherited and ran them under its 
monopoly (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Telecom Cellular 
Ltd). 
Government wanted still more deregulation for competition. 
It commissioned the Touche Ross Report (1988) 78 which 
concluded that competition in the provision of 
telecommunications services was both feasible and desirable. 
Government took its major steps towards deregulating the 
industry in 1989. It removed the barriers to entry into the 
telecommunications services market: this effectively ended 
Telecom's right to be the monopoly provider of network services. 
The Government believed that once barriers to entry were broken 
down, competition (or sometimes even the threat of competition) 
would encourage Telecom to be efficient and competitive (-re-
aligning its prices with its costs).79 
The 1987 Act was amended80 to break down the barriers to 
entry into the market for providing telecommunications services. 
This took effect from 1 April 1989. Section 3 - allowing only 
Telecom to operate a network - was repealed. 'Network operator' 
was re-defined . It no longer means Telecom: it now means 
Telecom and any person declared by the Governor General 1n 
75 Section 3. 
76 Or any other "medium used for telecommunication" - s 2. 
77 Part II. 
78 Touche Ross Competition in Telecommunications Networks (Department of Trade 
and Industry, Wellington, 1988). 
79 Above n 68, 4. 
80 Telecommunications Amendment Act 1988. 
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Council to be a network operator.81 The purpose of designation is 
to "facilitate entry into and competition in telecommunication 
markets".82 
Network operator status is no longer required to run a 
network. 83 That status simply facilitates competition - for 
instance, network operators have equal access to land for tree-
cutting etc. 
Ancillary legislation for breaking down barriers was 
passed, such as the Telecommunications (Disclosure) regulations 
1990, making Telecom set out pricing information etc relevant to 
new entrants. 
In June 1990, the Government sold Telecom to two 
American telephone companies, Ameritech and Bell Atlantic, for 
US$ 2.4 billion. 
B Revising New Zealand's System of Radio Spectrum 
Management 
The changes made 1n 1989 by the Government to the system 
of spectrum management in New Zealand were largely as a result 
of a review which it had commissioned, the NERA Report. In the 
background to its proposals , NERA noted that: 84 
Concern that [the] centralised system of spectrum management and 
allocation would not perform well, in terms of its effect on economic 
efficiency, competition and social welfare, once barriers into the 
telecommunications and broadcasting industry [were] removed and as 
the demand for spectrum grows, motivated the Government to 
commission the investigation of alternative methods of spectrum 
management. ... 
81 Telecommunications Act 1987, s 2A. 
82 Telecommunications Act 1987, s 2A(1). 
83 The 1987 Act does limit the class of persons who can provide international 
telecommunications services - s SB. 
84 NERA Management of the Radio Frequency Spectrum in New Zealand (A Report for 
the New Zealand Government, London, 1988) 1. 
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It is necessary to examine the former system of spectrum 
management, in order to understand how the government shifted 
responsibility for regulating use from itself to the private 
sector. 
1 The former licensing system 
Until 1987, the Post Office as manager had allocated out 
bands of spectrum under national and international regulations. 
According to the NERA Report , the main (State-owned) users -
including the telecommunications division of the Post Office85 -
largely planned their own use within those bands where they were 
sole users: the Post Office planned and co-ordinated assignments 
made to other users . Disputes over use were either internalised 
or negotiated amongst the other users and the Post Office.86 
After 1987, the Radio Frequency Service (part of the 
Department of Trade and Industry) managed the spectrum , 
according to the Telecommunications Act 1987 and the Radio 
Regulations 1987 made under it . The 1987 Act empowered the 
Secretary of Trade and Industry to license the supply and use of 
radio apparatus :87 the Regulations forbade the installation , 
operation or use of radio apparatus without a licence .88 . The 
Secretary could also license the use of frequencies .89 The holder 
of such a licence could make agreements with persons wanting to 
communicate on the frequencies specified in the licence .9 0 
Licences could not be sold or transferred , however . They were 
issued for one year but with an expectation of renewal. 91 
The Regulations set out a framework of considerations for 
the Secretary's decision whether or not to grant a licence , 
85 The others were the Broadcasting Corporation and the Ministry of Defence. 
86 Above n 84 , 24. 
87 That is, apparatus for transmitting and receiving radiocommunications. 
88 Clause 6. 
89 Clause 12(1). 
90 Clause 12(2) . 
91 Above n 84, 25 , 71. 
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including any international agreements,92 the public interest,93 
and the technical compatibility of the apparatus or use sought to 
be licensed with already-licensed apparatus or uses.94 Spectrum 
was generally licensed on a first-come, first-served basis , but 
within a framework of defined allocations and band plans .95 
The essence of the administrative system was that 
Govern ment96 managed the spectrum . Spectrum allocation was 
planned so as to maximise efficiency and minimise interference 
between users. It is impossible to transmit exactly on a single 
frequency or within a single band of frequencies. Some signals 
are always emitted beyond the boundaries of the transmitting 
frequency (or band).97 
When picked up by other users' equipment, these signals 
constitute 'interference'. "Interference reduces the ability of the 
party being interfered with to have his signal clearly received". 98 
Spectrum management cannot eliminate interference. The NERA 
Report , referring to assignment under the administrative system , 
claimed that an assignment of spectrum embodied 2 rights , the 
right to transmit and the right to interfere, and that the second -
the legal limit on interference caused by one user to others - lies 
"at the heart of spectrum management" because this ... "determines 
the actions a spectrum user is permitted to engage in , those that 
are proscribed and, from a global perspective , the value of the 
spectrum that results from the permitted mixture of utilisation 
between 'primary' transmissions and interference". 99 The Report 
noted that the RFS was responsible both for setting interference 
92 Clause 13(1 )(a). 
93 In achieving the maximum benefit from the radio spectrum , cl 13(1 )(b). 
94 Clause 13(1 )(c). 
95 Presumably, public interest considerations had helped to shape these plans - for 
example, in deciding whether new services were desirable or should be restricted . 
96 Through the Radio Frequency Service. 
97 See appendix I. 
98 Above n 84, 85 . 
99 Above n 84, 85. 
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standards 100 and for resolving conflicts if the standards were 
breached, or proved to be inadequate.101 
In summary:102 
By licensing apparatus, RFS by implication also determine[d] the use 
of each part of the spectrum and the level of interference judged to be 
acceptable. These decisions [were], by and large, based on 
engineering rather than economic criteria, although RFS [was] 
increasingly aware of the economic trade-offs involved in such 
judgements. RFS use[d] its expertise to assign compatible users to 
adjacent frequencies and areas, and ma[d]e use of guardbands (largely 
unused frequencies) where spectrum users require a high level of 
interference protection. 
However, licensees could not enforce their rights. 
Sometimes there was a sort of compensation for 'loss' of existing 
rights, in that if the RFS decided that an existing user should 
make way103 for a new user, "RFS's approach has been to oblige 
the new user to compensate the existing user for any dislocation 
involved in moving to another part of the spectrum". 104 Existing 
users could not refuse to move, though, nor could they demand a 
price for spectrum .1 o5 
Where rights were diminished by interference, and where 
negotiation between the parties failed, they could only complain 
to the RFS, who would try to resolve the dispute by taking action 
against the source of interference.1 o6 NERA thought that 
interference might be controlled better within a regime of 
enforceable property rights in spectrum, because "[a]s long as a 
spectrum user is forced to pay the cost his interference imposes 
on other parties, the user has an incentive to refrain from all 
10° Clause 36 of the 1987 Regulations empowered the Secretary to set limits on the 
intensity of interfering signals. 
101 Above n 84,74. 
1 02 Above n 84, 25. 
103 That is, move to frequencies in another part of the spectrum. 
1 04 Above n 84, 70. 
1 05 Above n 84, 70. 
106 Above n 84, 74. The Report noted that parties could have further recourse to 
the courts if a licensee did not consider the RFS's response to a complaint to be 
objectively reasonable. 
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interference that is more costly than the cost of eliminating the 
interference."107 
2. NERA's 'market allocation' proposal 
The NERA Report suggested that Government implement a 
system of tradeable property rights in the radio spectrum . 
Governmental regulation would largely be replaced by the 
operation of 'spectrum markets' , decentralising decisions 
concerning the use of spectrum by letting individual users resolve 
it among themselves .108 NERA calculated that the market-based 
approach would lead to more efficient spectrum allocation , 
because the users hold the information needed for these 
decisions. For example , NERA believed that users would reveal 
the best purpose to which a channel could be put , through the 
prices they would offer to pay for it.1 o9 And , "allowing spectrum 
users to decide among themselves the patterns of interference 
that will be mutually permitted is attractive because users are 
likely to have a much better notion of the cost of interference on 
the one hand and the cost of abating interference on the other". 11 0 
NERA acknowledged , however , that the advantages of a 
market-based approach could be off-set by the numerous bilateral 
negotiations which it might necessitate.1 11 The problems of 
substituting the operation of 'the market' for regulat ion are 
discussed further in Part IV. 
3 The Radiocommunications Act 1989 
The Radiocommunications Act 1989 was drafted around 
NERA's 'market allocation' proposal. The reformers in government 
"realized that it was impossible to create a market regime in the 
telecommunications industry 112 as a whole if one critical factor 
1 07 Above n 84 , 86 . 
1 08 Above n 84, 2-3. 
109 Above n 84 , 2. 
11 O Above n 84 , 3. 
111 Above n 84 , 3. 
11 2 And surely , the broadcasting industry . 
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of production - radio frequencies - was allocated by non-market 
mechanisms."113 The 1989 Act was designed to "facilitate 
competitive entry in telecommunication and broadcasting, as well 
as to promote efficiency in spectrum management."114 For 
completeness,.this section of the paper sketches the body of that 
Act. It then concentrates on the provisions in the Act for 
regulating the 'boundaries' of rights created under it, because this 
highlights most dramatically the shift from public to private law. 
The case study in the next section illustrates this . 
(a) General 
The Act allows the Secretary of Commerce to apply for 
rights to manage radio frequencies to be recorded in the Register 
of Radio Frequencies.11 5 The Crown is to be named as manager of 
all original management rights:116 it can sell them. These rights , 
lasting up to 20 years , are not limited to any specific 
telecommunication or broadcasting application. Management 
rights have "certain attributes of property" ;117 they can be 
transferred, aggregated, divided, and used as financial 
security_ 118 Managers have the right to issue licences for the use 
of frequencies contained within the limits of their rights . 
Transactions involving spectrum rights are formally registered . 
The Registrar of Radio Frequencies has correction and 
enforcement powers; the Act also creates "private legal remedies 
for the protection of rights - including new actions in tort and 
for damages." 11 9 In the transition to the management rights 
system, the Act preserved existing licences granted under the 
administrative system, 12o giving those licensees 'incumbency 
113 M Mueller Reform of Spectrum Management: Lessons From New Zealand (Reason 
Foundation, USA, 1991) 3. 
11 4 Ministry of Commerce Telecommunications Information Leaflet No 1 
(Wellington, 21 April 1992) 4. 
11 5 Section 9. The Register of Radio Frequencies is set up under s 5 of the Act. 
11 6 Section 11 . 
117 Above n 74, 12028. 
118 Above n 74. 
119 Above n 74,12028. 
120 Section 140 ; Part XVI of the Act generally. 
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rights' for operating on frequencies over which management 
rights were to be granted.121 
If Government122 does not create management rights over 
radio frequencies, they can continue to be licensed out under the 
administrative system. The Radio Regulations 1987 still apply. 
Once management rights are created, however, the administrative 
regime (including the Regulations) entirely ceases to apply. 
(b) Regulation of boundaries 
According to the Act, a record of management rights must 
specify (inter alia):123 
(i) the range of frequencies to which the record 
relates; and 
(ii) the adjacent frequencies emission limit ("AFEL"). 
This is the maximum permitted power of emissions 
'spilt-over' by the manager onto frequencies outside 
his or her (its) range; and 
(iii) the 'protection limit'. This is a 'cap' on emissions 
'spilt-over' by other users onto frequencies within the 
manager's range. 
Usually the AFEL of one management right (A) and the 
protection limit of the adjacent right (B) are the same. The user 
of frequencies under right (A) cannot emit signals outside that 
band124 which are above a certain strength; frequencies under 
right (B) are free of signals above that strength12 5 emitted by a 
user under (A) (or any other management right).12s 
The relationship of AFEL's with protection limits, and the 
level at which they are set, both attempts to achieve reasonable 
121 Providing the license was current on 1 July 1989. 
122 Through the Secretary of Commerce. 
123 Section 34. 
124 That is, into right (B). 
125 That is, 'clear' for the user under management right (B). 
126 See appendix I. 
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use ot the spectrum , and to be attractive to users.127 Limits set 
vary from case to case. The Ministry has no policy of setting 
protection limits at the legal minimum , 128 although this could 
make the spectrum more attractive to users , apparently letting 
them maximise band-usage (by allowing them higher out-of-band 
emissions) . 129 In setting the limits it pays some regard to the 
likely use of bands , which it ascertains from responses to 
notifications of bands to be offered for tender.130 
These limits can be adjusted : the Secretary and any manager 
can agree to modify the protection limit apply ing to that 
manager's record of rights , 131 and managers can agree between 
themselves to modify AFEL's. 132 
The Act gives every manager , subject to the limits of its 
management right , the right to grant licences over the 
frequencies it manages , with regard to any location in New 
Zealand.133 No one can transmit on any managed frequency except 
in accordance with a licence.134 Management and 'use' rights , 
then , are distinct ; even managers must licence themselves to use 
the frequencies they control. 
A manager can grant a licence (including to itself) to 
transmit radio waves13 5 or unwanted emissions136 on frequencies 
within its record of management rights , or to be free from 
127 According to Mr W Wedderspoon , Manager of National Radio Spectrum Policy, 
Ministry of Commerce (conversation with the writer, 30 September 1993). 
128 Which is tiny ; s 38. 
129 At the same time, it would lessen a manager's protection against the impingement 
of other users' signals into its own band. 
130 Ministry of Commerce The Radiocommunications Act 1989 (Information Leaflet , 
Wellington , 15 July 1993) 2. The Ministry may not, however, predict the resu lt of 
sales - see below Part IV B. 
131 Section 36. 
132 Section 40 , subject to a certification of compatibility ; see below part Ill 3. 
133 Sections 48 , 98. 
134 Section 103. 
135 Section 48(a) -(b) . 
13 6 Section 48(c). 
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interference caused by any person transmitting on radio waves 
within the manager's record.137 
Licences are confined by the limits of the management right 
under which they are granted:1 38 for instance, managers must 
apply the AFEL's and protection limits (which the Ministry sets 
between management rights) to the licences they create . A 
manager granting a licence to transmit radio waves specifies 
(inter alia):139 
(i) the areas and frequencies for transmissions ; 
(ii) the 'receive coverage area';14o 
(iii) maximum permitted interfering signals ;141 and 
(iv) unwanted emission limits . 
Unwanted emission limits ("UEL's") are the maximum power 
levels which a licensee can emit onto frequencies outside his or 
her range . UEL's are constrained by the AFEL's of the management 
right - that is , a licensee at the boundary of a band of frequencies 
must keep unwanted emissions below the protection limit of the 
adjacent management right. 
The power of adjustment which the Act leaves to managers 
is important because the limits on out-of-band emissions affect 
the possible power of emissions on frequencies within the band 
(but near its boundaries). Subject to minimal statutory 
constraints, managers now adjust these limits between 
themselves; a role previously undertaken by government. 
Government's former regulatory role has largely been replaced by 
bilateral negotiation. 
Even so, Govern ment1 42 still has some supervisory 
involvement (by prohibiting registration in some circumstances). 
The AFEL's of a management right cannot be registered or 
137 Section 48(d). 
138 Sections 49(e)(ii) , 101 (1 )(a) . 
139 Section 49 . 
140 Not defined by the Act. 
141 Discussed within. 
142 Through the Radio Frequency Service of the Ministry of Commerce. 
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modified, 143 nor can a licence to transmit radio waves or 
unwanted emissions be registered , 144 nor can its UEL's be 
registered or modified, 14 5 until the Registrar has received 
certification from an approved engineer146 that the right/ change 
sought to be registered: 
(a) will not endanger the functioning of any 
radionavigation service; and 
(b) will not endanger the functioning of any radio 
service essential to the protection of life or property; 
and 
(c) is technically compatible with services operated 
pursuant to existing licences, having regard to -
(i) the International Radio Regulations; and 
(ii) the CCIR Reports and Recommendations; and 
(iii) annex 1 O to the Convention on Civil 
Aviation ;and 
(iv) the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea ; and 
(v) any relevant safety standards issued by the 
Secretary. 
4 Case study: radio interference between cellular 
telephones 
The deregulation of the telecommunications industry meant 
that BellSouth could establish a network to provide cellular 
telephone services in competition with Telecom Cellular . Under 
the 'spectrum rights' regime, it has bought and controls the radio 
frequencies which it need to provide those services. The two 
companies propose to compete with different cellular systems: 
Telecom Cellular uses 'AMPS' (the North American system) ; 
BellSouth will operate the European 'GSM' system . AMPS uses 
frequencies from 825 MHz to 890 MHz; GSM , from 890 MHz to 960 
143 Sections 39(2), 40(3). 
144 Section 25(2). 
145 Sections 53, 54 . 
146 Approved under s 130. 
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MHz. The 2 systems were developed and operate in different 
parts of the world; interference between them has not been a 
problem in practice. Therefore it has not been taken into account 
in global allocations ; the ITU allocation for cellular frequencies 
runs straight from 825 MHz to 960 MHz. 
New Zealand , though, acknowledges both systems. Before 
the Radiocommunications Act 1989 was passed , Telecom Cellular 
was operating in the AMPS-B band , from 835 MHz to 845 MHz and 
from 880 MHz to 890 MHz. Under the Act, it acquired incumbency 
rights ( to continue that operation). 14 7 
In May 1990, the Government tendered and sold management 
rights for 3 more frequency blocks.148 Each block has 2 parts 
because a cell phone transmits and receives on different 
frequencies. Normally a guard band (-a block of vacant 
frequencies-) 1 49 is left between transmission and reception 
frequencies.150 
The AMPS and GSM systems each have a guard band within 
their own systems , to stop interference between their own 
transmission and reception frequencies . But as a result of the 
sales of spectrum management rights , there was no guard band in 
New Zealand between the 2 systems : the rights were separated 
only by their AFEL's and protection limits. These are the only 
restraints that the Act requires the Ministry to set between 
management rights . The protection limit set at 890 MHz was the 
minimum allowed by the Act , 15 1 ie giving adjacent users the 
maximum freedom allowed by the Act in the strength of signals 
they transmit outside their bands. This means that BellSouth , 
which owns management rights to the 890-897 MHz band , must 
keep emissions on frequencies less than 890 MHz below a certain 
strength: by registering BellSouth's management rights , the 
Ministry promised Telecom Cellular , which owns the 880-890 
147 Radiocommunications Act 1989, Part XVI. 
148 See appendix I. 
149 At least, frequencies unused by cellphones. 
150 See appendix I. 
151 (50 dBW); see s 38. 
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MHz band, that within that band it will be protected from signals 
above a certain strength emitted by other users. 
Both Telecom Cellular and BellSouth have granted 
themselves licences to transmit radio waves and to be free from 
interference on the frequencies they manage. The licences extend 
to frequencies at the very boundaries of their management rights , 
but comply with the AFEL's and protection limits set by the 
Ministry of Commerce. Each company has complied with the law 
but interference problems still arise.152 
The protection limits set are , in fact , too low. Both 
companies need reasonably high protection from interference, for 
the sake of their customers.1 53 There is simply not room between 
their bands of frequencies for that protection . 
Because a transmitted signal is stronger than a received 
one , the lack of protection causes 2 interference problems : 
(1) transmission from a Telecom Cellular (AMPS-B) 
cell-base could block out reception on a BellSouth 
(GSM-A) cell-base ; 
(2) if a BellSouth (GSM-A) cell phone (mobile unit) and 
a Telecom Cellular (AMPS-B) cell phone were 
physically adjacent , transmission from the BellSouth 
cell phone at around 890 MHz would overload reception 
for a Telecom Cellular cell phone operating on nearby 
frequencies. 
Last year, the Ministry of Commerce , Telecom Cellular and 
BellSouth held discussions about the lack of a guard band. This 
resulted in a 0.9 MHz guard band being set up .1 54 The Ministry 
'tacked' additional frequencies onto the upper end of the GSM-A 
152 According to Be11South 's Public Relations Manager: 
"The scope and nature of the interference only became a reality once we started 
operating our network. At this time it became apparent the 0.9MHz guard band may 
not be sufficient. We are unaware of similar problems being encountered overseas, 
probably because other countries have arranged their frequencies differently."; 
(letter to the writer, dated 9 August 1993). 
153 Cellular telephone users. 
154 This is the guard band referred to in the letter from BellSouth , above n 152. 
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band, and resumed control over the 0.9 MHz of frequencies at the 
lower end, which form a guard band. (The 'swap' took place before 
ownership of the GSM-B band was settled). 
But interference problems remain. The Act provides for 
licensees (rightholders) to enforce their rights against each 
other. Together, the receive coverage location and the 'maximum 
permitted interfering signals' which a manager sets in a 
transmission licence , form a guarantee of protected reception by 
the manager to the licensee :155 the manager undertakes not to 
expose the licensee to interference caused by its re-licensing of 
that frequency in that area. But the 'maximum permitted 
interfering signals' dictate the level of interference in that area 
that no other user can exceed, so they also protect the licensee 
from other licensees under adjacent management rights. The Act 
does not limit the maximum permitted interfering signals which 
the manager sets for the licensee. 
Section 107 allows a rightholder (A) to require a 
subsequent one (B) to modify emissions impinging on A's 'receive 
coverage area' where the emissions are above the maximum 
permitted interfering signals permitted by A's licence. This right 
belongs to the first-registered licensee. 
Telecom Cellular registered its licences from 3 November 
1992 to 30 November 1992 ; BellSouth's first licence was 
registered on 24 February 1993. The setting by each company of 
adequate levels of protection from interference forces section 
107 to apply. prima facie , Bell South must give way . This seems 
unfair because the Act deems the incumbent's licence to have 
been granted before others, automatically giving priority to the 
incumbent's licence.156 
Section 107 provides, in the alternative, for the parties to 
negotiate a solution. They are doing so. If BellSouth exceeded 
interference limits which Telecom Cellular set in licensing itself 
155 Avoidance of 'co-channel interference.' 
156 Section 181. 
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first , then (given section 107) , Telecom Cellular could rely 
heavily in negotiations on its legal precedence. This gives it less 
incentive to agree with BellSouth to a mutual widening of the 0.9 
MHz guard band, whereby each company would lose some cellular 
frequencies. One alternative proposed by the Ministry has been to 
swap BellSouth with incumbent (non-cellular) users in the third 
GSM band , GSM-C. This would require further bilateral 
agreements , and assumes that equipment would be compatible . 
5 Responsibility for regulating interference 
As noted above , 15 7 the Ministry must test certain limits of 
management rights and licences for compatibility with 'existing 
licences'. It does so by reference only to the five sub-paragraphs 
listed , instead of 'having regard' to these factors as part of a 
wider assessment of compatibility between the limit sought to 
be changed or registered and 'services operated pursuant to 
existing licences'. 
The Ministry held the technical compatibility test to be 
satisfied tor Telecom Cellular's and BellSouth's licences . Had it 
considered the technical compatibility in fact of the limits of 
BellSouth's with Telecom's 'services operated pursuant to 
existing licences' , it could have held that the interference levels 
made them unsuitable for registration , and required the levels to 
be adjusted before registration the services began to compete . 
The 'narrow' application of the test circumscribes the 
Ministry's supervisory role: 158 it is responsible only for 
protecting the listed (generally international) concerns. After 
all : 1 5 g 
The object [of privatising spectrum rights] is to allow the 
marketplace to take over fundamental spectrum management 
functions , such as planning , channelization, clearance and reallocation 
of bands , introduction of new services, etc. 
157 Above Part Ill 3. 
158 Absolves it from responsibility for interference levels between spectrum users. 
159 M Mueller, above 113, 15. 
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Government cannot entirely escape the rigours of public 
law, however. The judgement in Mire/le Pty Ltd v The Attorney 
General and The Ministry of Commerce and Ors1 6o implied 
additional duties onto the Ministry in the sale process , given that 
the Ministry was selling public assets on behalf of the 
Government. Heron J decided that although the tendering process 
was purely contractual , the Ministry was acting under statutory 
powers, so its actions were reviewable. He held it unreasonable 
for the Ministry to reject a tender bid on the basis of a "plain 
mistake, one which could be easily rectified and which raised no 
ambiguity in fact."161 
By making this decision , Heron J was subjecting the 
Ministry to public law duties even when it acted in a private 
(contractual) capacity.162 He prevented the Ministry from relying 
on the conditions which it had spec ified1 63 for the validity of 
tenders , and required it to involve itself in the sale process , to 
actively ensure as much competition as possible in the sales . 
Even so , His Honour stressed the need for impartiality and 
even-handedness in the sale process.164 These comments apply 
equally to the outcome of the sale. Even if the Min istry 
anticipated - on the ITU allocations and responses to its surveys 
- that cellular users would buy these bands , it could not direct 
the result by , say , testing for interference and adjusting the 
bands' boundaries . The tender philosophy is competitive . 
160 Unreported, 27 November 1991 , High Court Wellington Registry CP 969/91 . 1 61 Above n 160, 1 9. 
162 Compare this with the Stock Exchange case , below Part IV A. Could even the 
public nature of the Ministry and of the assets require it to alter the contractual 
basis of the tender? The decision is being taken on appeal. 
163 In the call for tenders . 
164 Above n 160, 20. 
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IV THE SHIFT FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE LAW 
'Privatisation' has become "economic orthodoxy worldwide . 
Last year alone , governments sold $69 bill ion-worth of state-
owned enterprises. The amount ra ised since the mid-1980s is 
more than $300 billion ."1 65 New Zealand itself has sold billions 
of dollars worth of assets .1 66 
According to Taggart , Labour Ministers have preferred the 
label 'asset sales' over 'privatisation' . But to him , the 
'privatisation' label accurately describes the transfer of power 
involved in the process:167 
The root of the word is private, and its original meaning was 'not 
holding public office or official position .' So the derivation , 
privatisation , well captures the significance of the process: the sh ift 
from the public to the private sphere. 
It is difficult to 'label ' the nature of the transfer of power 
over the radio spectrum. But 'The Economist' notes that there are 
at least 57 types of privatisation !168 And the impetus behind the 
private spectrum rights system is (broadly) the same as that 
underlying the sale of other State assets - to free the State from 
its role as provider and reduce its regulatory role , letting the 
'market' and 'private law take over. But are these mechanisms of 
control substitutable for each other, especially where resources 
important for the public's well-being are concerned? 
Part 11 of the paper presented a set of traits common to 
public enterprises , ie factors 'qualifying' the State to provide and 
control them . Some of these resources can be divorced more 
easily from the State - ie , are more suited to competition - than 
others. This Part of the paper argues that the need for regulation 
is particularly acute where the resource is - like the radio 
spectrum - limited and highly specialised: private law does not 
165 The Economist (vol 328, 21-27 August 1993) 9. 
166 See appendix 11 . 
167 M Taggart Corporatisation, Privatisation and Public Law (Legal Research 
Foundation , Auckland, 1990)18. 
1 68 Above n 165, 1 6. 
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contain the mechanisms to maximise its use and fully enable 
competition using the resource. First, however, it is necessary to 
distinguish public from private law, to draw out the implications 
of shifting an asset from public to private ownership. 
A Public Versus Private Control 
'Public bodies' are subject to special controls under public 
law. But the difference between public and private bodies is very 
hard to draw. Whether a body is a 'public' body depends on the 
nature of the body and its activities.1 69 
'public' refers to the workings of the State. 
Traditionally, the label 
A 'public' body, then 
should somehow be empowered by the State. The theory of 
separation of powers suggests that a 'public body' should, for the 
purposes of (judicial) control, be one empowered by Parliament or 
by the Executive - that is, by statute, subordinate legislation or 
the prerogative. This somewhat broad (and traditional) 
characterisation is adopted so as to classify corporatized 
e nte rp rises 17o as 'public bodies' and to distinguish the remedies 
available against them from those against the owners of 
privatised enterprises.171 
Labelling bodies as 'public' or 'private' is not particularly 
significant for the purposes of judicial review, 172 because public 
bodies do not act solely under public law. Historically, the 
(public-private) law distinction was important because the 
remedies available in public law (judicial review) - namely 
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus - were distinct from those 
available in private law - damages, injunction or declaration. 
(Since the Judicature Amendment Act 1977, all these remedies 
are available in a judicial review action. Moreover review under 
that Act does not hinge on a public-private law distinction _ 173 It 
169 Harlow disputes the validity of the distinction; see C Harlow "Public and Private 
Law" (1980) 43 MLR 241. 
170 State-owned enterprises. 
171 Privatized Telecom and the purchasers of spectrum rights. 
172 On the assumption that 'public' and 'private' law are also distinguishable; 
compare Harlow, above n 169. 
173 That is, on whether the body challenged acted in a public or a private capacity. 
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depends on from where the decision-maker got the authority to 
make the challenged-decision: applicants can seek review of the 
exercise, by persons, 174 of statutory powers. Statutory powers 
are rights or powers conferred by legislation or by the governing 
instruments of any body corporate).175 
Decided cases have already made clear that a 'public' body 
can act in a 'private' capacity and vice versa. The New Zealand 
Court of Appeal has effectively confirmed that even a 'public' 
body can exercise contractual rights in the same way as a private 
citizen: the New Zealand Stock Exchange has a statutory 
foundation 176 but it lists companies under contract only; the 
Court refused to review the exercise of the Exchange's 
(contractual) right to suspend listing. 1 77 By comparison, the 
English Court of Appeal reviewed the actions of the (English) 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, which had immense de facto 
powers although it had "no statutory, prerogative or common law 
powers and it is not in a contractual relationship with the 
financial market or those who deal in that market". 1 78 In the 
Mirelle case, 179 a 'public' body (the Ministry of Commerce) was 
exercising private (contractual) powers but since it was selling 
State assets on behalf of the community its actions were held to 
be reviewable ! 
A body's 'public' or 'private' nature is still important for the 
application of other (non-judicial) checks against it, though . 
Taggart argues that accountability for the exercise of a body's 
powers is diminished on corporatisation and further on 
privatisation_ 18o Theoretically , a government department or 
enterprise 1s more accountable than a private company: 
174 Judicature Amendment Act 1977, s 3. That Act defines 'person' widely. 
17 5 Judicial review of acts or decisions for which the Act does not provide still falls 
to the common law. 
176 The Sharebrokers Amendment Act 1981. 
177 NZ Stock Exchange v Listed Companies Association Incorporated [1984] 1 NZLR 
699. 
178 Regina v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Ex Parte Datafin [1987] 1 QB 815, 
825. 
179 Above n 160. 
180 Above n 167, 19. 
35 
Government ought to be less motivated by commercial concerns 
and more by political/social justice ones ; Government is 
accountable politically (at elections) and its organs are subject 
to specific accountability mechanisms such as judicial review by 
the courts , scrutiny by the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman , 
and the Official Information Act 1984. 
The specific accountability mechanisms are carried over to 
SOE' s 1 81 and supplemented by others such as scrutiny by 
Parliamentary select committees , their subjection to the 
Companies' Act 1955 and (statutorily required) Statements of 
Corporate lntent. 182 Only exercises of power by SOE's which are 
sufficiently directly traceable to the SOE Act 1986, or to the 
Memorandum or Articles of Association would be judicially 
reviewable under the Judicature Amendment Act 1977. Upon 
privatisation there is a further shift from 'public' accountability 
mechanisms to the realm of private law, ie the law governing 
relationships between private persons. Some exercises of power 
by a private company could still be judicially reviewable under 
the 1977 Act, 183 but potential plaintiffs would mostly have to 
draw their causes of action against the company from the law of 
contracts , commercial or competition law. 
B. Private Control and Competition 
Taggart claims that on privatisation , Government has 
sought efficiency through free market competition rather than 
regulation , even in core industries .1 84 It relies mainly on the 
Commerce Act 1986, the general competition law of New Zealand , 
for creating conditions of effective compet ition in 
telecommunications.18 5 When he introduced the 
181 Taggart describes the Ombudsman's 1989 investigation into the reasonableness 
of T elecom's standard telephone subscriber contract, above n 167, 14-16. 182 Section 9. 
183 If sufficiently related to its Memorandum or Articles of Association. 
184 Above n 167, 20-21. 
185 Commerce Commission Telecommunications Industry Inquiry Report (Commerce 
Commission , Wellington , 1992) 10-11 . 
36 
Telecommunications Amendment Bill 19881 86 to Parliament , the 
then-Minister for State-owned Enterprises stated that:1 87 
[f]rom 1 April 1989, competing businesses will be able to establish 
and operate telephone and other networks either by setting up 
facilities of their own or by inteconnecting with the Telecom 
Corporation network. In doing so they will be subject to the 
Commerce Act and other relevant legislation in common with other 
industries. Telecom Corporation itself, including the terms and 
conditions it offers for interconnections with its facilities, will also 
be constrained by the Commerce Act, which specifically prohibits a 
dominant firm from acting uncompetitively. 
One aspect of competition 1s the physical means of 
providing alternative services. The construction of a new , 
country-wide system of telephone wires and cables would be 
hindered by New Zealand's topography , the scattered nature of our 
population , and sheer cost. Accordingly , the existing networks 
must somehow be made available to competitors. 
America has developed an 'essential facilities' doctrine :188 
someone who has an essential facility must make it available to 
others on reasonable terms and conditions .189 (This is derived 
from old common law rules relating to innkeepers , ferrymen etc -
providers of essential services)_ 19o New Zealand has not fully 
adopted an 'essential services' doctrine . Parts of it , though , have 
been incorporated in our law - see , for instance , the Commerce 
Act 1986, section 36(1): 
36 Use of a dominant position in a market -
(1) No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that 
position for the purpose of -
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; 
or 
186 For deregulating the telecommunications industry. 
1 87 Above 185, 11. 
188 Or 'bottle-neck principle '. 
189 Barker J in Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland 
Airport) Ltd [1 987] 2 NZLR 64 7 discussed and adopted the principle from Hecht v 
Pro-Football Inc 570 F 2d 982 (1977). 
1 90 Above n 167, 29-30. 
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(b) Preventing the entry of any person into that or any other market; 
or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
The writer assumes that in 1987 Telecom had a dominant 
position in the 'market' for providing telecommunications 
services. The 'local loop', the system of wires connecting 
telephone units to the closest of the several exchanges through 
which a call might pass , was critical to its dominance. 
Competitors can rep I icate the faci I ities for long distance 
transmission of calls, but it is simply not economically feasible 
to replicate the local loop . However section 36(1 )(a) and (b) 
forbids Telecom to use that position as a means of preventing 
competition with itself. To avoid anti-competitive behaviour , 
Telecom must somehow allow its competitors access to its local 
loop ( essential facility) if they meet reasonable criteria . It does 
so by 'interconnection' - by letting competitors use1 91 the local 
loop which they cannot afford to duplicate .192 Government does 
not regulate interconnection:193 
This Government's policy is to set the framework for interconnection 
but not to involve the Government or its Departments in direct 
negotiations. Leave that to the interconnecting parties ... And if they 
can't reach agreement on particular points, they can take their 
differences to Court, where the Commerce Act and general competition 
law will be their adjudicator. 
By interconnection with Telecom's local loops, and by use of 
its own transmission lines, another service provider can compete 
with Telecom in the toll market; consumers can choose whose 
services they use. Cellular telephony can create even more 
competition, either by linking in to existing networks or as an 
alternative to them. Cellular networks must be able to link into 
the PSTN (wired networks) so that calls can be made between a 
cellular and a 'normal' telephone. By the Commerce Act and its 
own undertakings, Telecom is required to interconnect cellular 
191 For a fee . 
192 See appendix I 
1 93 Above n 185, 11. 
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users to the PSTN . This lets cellular service providers (eg 
Telecom Cellular and BellSouth) compete with 'normal' telephone 
services as well as with each other. Ultimately , cellular 
communications may become a technological substitute for the 
whole (wired) PSTN. Cellular services could be substituted 
entirely (without interconnection) for the wired network.1 94 
C Meeting a Need for Regulation 
Interconnection resolves one aspect of the dominance 
problem, which itself is one of a host of issues about competition 
in a deregulated telecommunications industry _ 19 5 But that issue 
has been 'solved' under the Commerce Act in conjunction with 
Telecom's own undertakings and government's threat of regulation 
in default of resolution . The industry has been even less 'freed 
up' in other countries . Taggart points out that in the United 
States , 'core industry' companies are in private ownership but are 
subject to extensive regulation intended to prevent monopoly 
profits and ensure uniform prices and service provision to 
customers. He notes that although the American 
telecommunications industry has been deregulated considerably , 
the American owners of the privatised Telecom (NZ) are regulated 
much more in the United States than here. And when British 
Telecom was privatised in 1984, a regulatory agency called the 
Office of Telecommunications was set up to prevent the company 
from abusing its near-monopoly position .196 
Regulation of the radio spectrum is even more important , 
because of its technical complexity . Competition for bands of 
frequencies is feasible , and the Commerce Act 1986 overcomes 
some of the barriers to providing competing cellular services -
for instance , link-ins to Telecom 's PSTN , and purchases of 
spectrum space that would cause dominance in the cellular 
194 Providers of cellular services would then be subject to their own dominance test. 
195 Note that even the threat of competition may suffice ; see above n 68 , 4. 196 Above n 167, 21. 
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market .197 But for the providers of cellular services , freedom to 
enter the market and to acquire spectrum space is arguably not 
enough to create condit ions of effective competition. The nature 
of the spectrum resource , and the inevitable spill-over of 
transmitted signals onto 
difficult to maximise 
intervention. 1 98 The 
competition statute , not a 
other frequencies , means that it is 
spectrum use without specialized 
Commerce Act 1986 is a 'general' 
tool for resolving hard questions about 
interference. And the first-in-time rule of section 107 is too 
badly stated , if competing users are free to set the ir own limits 
of freedom from interference within their bands. 
The distribution of spectrum rights between users needs to 
be regulated, at least in part. Perhaps one could , for example , 
induce the Ministry of Commerce to apply the 'technical 
compatibility' test more widely. AFEL's are set in the creation of 
a management right , ie before it is tendered. It would be 
impossible to know if the eventual use would be compatible in 
fact with services already operated . But in the adjustment of 
limits and the setting of licence limits , the intended use wo u Id 
generally be known , so that the level of interference which it 
would cause to existing uses could be scrutinized. However, like 
section 107, this gives priority to the first-user-in-time . Also , 
to extend the government's supervisory role is to slash at the 
roots of the spectrum-property-rights tree. Perhaps an arbitral 
body could be established , to which parties could refer 
interference disputes at any time after Government disposed of 
the management right. 19 9 This could avoid resort to the harsh 
ru1e 2°0 of section 107. The Act can be improved over time but for 
users who have themselves assumed the risks and costs of 
spectrum management, 'time is money' ... . 
197 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission (1991 ) 3 
NZBLC 102,340 . 
198 "This is the fallacy of reifying the spectrum - assuming that it is a thing which can be divided up into discrete parcels"; see above n 113, 31. 
199 Note that Government is still responsible for regulating licences created under the administrative system as continued ( ie where no management right has been created). 
20° First -in -time. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The communications services which government provided since the colony's birth were essential to New Zealand's bonding as a nation .2°1 They also joined New Zealand to the world 
community for the price of standardisation. The 
internationalisation of telecommunications requires common standards for the benefit of users,202 operators,2 o s 
manufacturers ,204 and States2os alike. 
Tension emerges , however , between the need for standardisation and the benefits of competition - States face this tension in international relations2° 6 and 'at home.' New 
Zealand has provided for recognition of its international 
commitments 207 even while pursuing a competitive domestic telecommunications policy . It has shed its traditional role of 
providing telecommunications services and allocations of radio spectrum , and reduced its regulatory role. 
Telecommunications and the radio spectrum may have been 
shifted too far out of public control. The radio spectrum , for example, is such a specialized resource that regulation may be 
needed for maximum efficiency in its use. (The degree of 
regulation, and the stage at which it should be imposed , are topics for further study). 
201 Rather than our being a collection of scattered settlements. 202 Who, for example, want the power to call as many locations as possible, quickly and cheaply. They want their calls protected from other users and the States from or to which calls are made. They want to use their phones for special purposes (such as emergency calls) and to benefit from developing technology. 203 Whose ability to operate competitively (and universally) is aided by uniformity of conditions and compatibility of equipment throughout the States in which they operate. 
204 Manufacturers want their equipment used as widely as possible (for competition). This requires recognition of those systems by states. 2o5 States need to satisfy domestic interests ( individuals', operators', and manufacturers) and the international community. 
206 By their desires to pursue domestic economic policy. 207 For example, by the 'compatibility' tests of the Radiocommunications Act 1989. 
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Public needs are not directly protected under a privatised 
system of telecommunications. But the threat of regulation , at 
least , seems to have encouraged Telecom to behave competitively. 
Interconnection agreements , for example , equip new service 
providers for the competition which Government envisaged as 
promoting and serving customers' needs. 
Consumers will be able to assess the success of 
deregulation and privatisation measures in terms of , for example , 
increased efficiency in the provision of telecommunications 
services and changes to pricing policy. In a wider context , the 
effects of privatisation will be revealed through citizens' views 
of their changed relationsh ip with the State . 
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APPENDIX II 
Table 2: Asset Sales to JO June 1990 ( Ntvv 2e,JMJ.. J 
Business Sale price (Sm) Settlement date Purchaser 
NZ Steel 3'1:7.2 22.3.88 Equiticorp bought 90% 
of the Crown's 
interest( 1) 
Petrocorp 801.1 31.3.88 Fletcher Challenge Ltd 
Health Computing Services 4.2 7.11.88 Paxus Information 
Services 
Development Finance 
Corporation 111.3 18.11.88 National Provident 
Fund (80%) Salomon 
Bras (20%) 
Post Bank 665.4 28.2.89 ANZ 
- Completion 13.1 31.10.89 
Shipping Corp 18.5 3.4.89 ACT (NZ) Ltd 
- Completion 15 .1 19.3.90 
Air New Zealand 660.0 17.4.89 (2) 
Landcorp Financial Instruments 15.7 7.3.89 Mortgagees 
Landcorp Financial Instruments 32.3 5.10.89 
Landcorp Financial Instruments 27.0 5.2.90 
Rural Bank 550.0 31.10.89 Fletcher Challenge Ltd 
Government Print 20.0 1989/90 Various(}) 
Government Print (Deposit) 2.3 2.90 Rank Group(4) 
Government Print 12.7 30.6.90 Rank Group 
National Film Unit 1.5 23.3.90 TVNZ(5) 
Communicate NZ 0.1 8.12.89 DAC Group Ltd(6) 
State Insurance 735.0 28.6.90 Northwich Insurance 
Telecom NZ Ltd 4.25 
billion 14.6.90 (7) 
Tourist Hotel Corp 73.8 15.6.90 Southern Pacific Hotels 
(NZ) Ltd 
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